Upping the Ante: Collective Litigation in Latin America by Oquendo, Ángel
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Faculty Articles and Papers School of Law
2009
Upping the Ante: Collective Litigation in Latin
America
Ángel Oquendo
University of Connecticut School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Law
and Society Commons
Recommended Citation
Oquendo, Ángel, "Upping the Ante: Collective Litigation in Latin America" (2009). Faculty Articles and Papers. 228.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers/228
? ???? ?????
Citation: 47 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 248 2008-2009 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Aug 16 13:02:17 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0010-1931
Articles
Upping the Ante:
Collective Litigation in Latin America
ANGEL R. OQUENDO*
This work contends that Latin America has launched a
true revolution on collective rights: moving beyond
the paradigm of group entitlements, which concern a
determinate-though potentially enormous-
collectivity, to that of comprehensive entitlements,
which generally pertain to society as a whole. Latin
American jurisdictions have created innovative pro-
cedural mechanisms in this area: the collective writ
of protection for the realization of group rights, the
popular action for the civic vindication of comprehen-
sive entitlements, and the public civil action for the of-
ficial enforcement of both kinds of rights. The U.S.
legal order has much to learn from a comparative re-
flection upon these developments. It could, accord-
ingly, open up to the creation of a universally avail-
able citizen's suit, the institution of an autonomous
state body with power to file complaints on behalf of
communal and societal interests, the concession of
standing to organizations (as well as individuals) to
pursue class suits, and the introduction of a single,
straightforward classification under Rule 23(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The article con-
cludes by calling attention to the tension between
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Latin American efforts to implement trans-individual
guaranties and the sporadic precariousness of the rule
of law in the region. It argues that, beyond adopting
new measures or punishing violators more severely,
the countries affected must broadly enhance the le-
gitimacy of legal norms by renewing their commitment
to democracy, as well as to other ideals, such as the
rule of law itself, personal freedom, and (above all)
solidarity.
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Nos cruzamos en noche de ventisca;
en las mismas posadas estuvimos,
ciegos dormidos y ciegos despiertos.'
- GABRIELA MISTRAL, Dos trascordados, LAGAR 11 (1991)
I. WARM-UP
Upon accepting the Nobel Prize for Literature in Stockholm,
Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez spoke these words: "America Latina no
quiere ni tiene por qu6 ser un alfil sin albedrio, ni tiene nada de qui-
m~rico que sus designios de independencia y originalidad se convier-
tan en una aspiracirn occidental.,2  Indeed, Latin (or Iberian)3
1. Literally: "Our paths crossed on that blustery night; we lodged at the same inns,
blindly asleep and awake."
2. Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez, Recipient of 1982 Nobel Prize in Literature, Nobel Lec-
ture: La soledad de Amrica Latina (Dec. 8, 1982), translated in THE NOBEL PRIZES 1982
(Wilhelm Odelberg ed., 1983) ("Latin America neither wants, nor has any reason, to be a
pawn without a will of its own; nor is it merely wishful thinking that its quest for independ-
ence and originality should become a Western aspiration.").
3. The term "Latin America" technically refers to the former colonies of "Latin" na-
tions, such as Spain, Portugal and France. Nowadays, however, it usually denominates Ibe-
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America has recently started acting fiercely independently and origi-
nally with respect to the law. It has, once and again, broken with the
past, created unprecedented possibilities and positioned itself to in-
fluence the rest of the world. This paper investigates this general
phenomenon in the context of collective suits. It principally focuses
on the Brazilian legal system, which has displayed the most innova-
tiveness in this area, but also turns to other jurisdictions in order to
illustrate the breadth of this development.
Accordingly, the present inquiry casts aside the usual cliches
of Latin America as a land of chaos, oppression, lawlessness and
hopelessness. It shows a radically different and oft-neglected side of
the coin. At the same time, it resists the luring temptation to depict
the region as a monolithic whole. The article takes pains to under-
score the profound legal diversity that permeates this vast territory. It
identifies transnational trends but stresses that the specific form that
they take and the extent of their pervasiveness vary enormously from
one country to the next.
The aim of the discussion is not merely to describe represen-
tative litigation south of the border, but rather to select certain prom-
ising aspects and thereupon imagine a new and improved praxis. In-
asmuch as this approach concentrates on existing institutions and on
their possible reformation, transitioning from what is to what might
and should be, it requires proceeding both descriptively and norma-
tively (perhaps more in the latter than in the former fashion).
This work expounds the thesis that Latin America has
launched a true revolution on collective rights: moving beyond the
paradigm of group entitlements, which concern a determinate-
though potentially enormous--collectivity, to that of comprehensive
rian America and thus refers only to the New World territories colonized by the nations that
occupy the Iberian peninsula, i.e., Spain and Portugal. This paper deploys the term "Latin
America" in this contemporary, albeit inaccurate, sense. It makes use of the more precise,
but less current, expression "Iberian American" only intermittently. It thus seeks to maintain
the former as familiar and readily comprehensible, while gradually introducing the latter.
The piece focuses on Iberian American countries because, as partial cultural descendants of
nations that share so much history, they evince considerable coherence in their conceptions
of rights. Former Spanish and Portuguese colonies converged legally during colonial times
and frequently developed their law under the influence of each other after independence.
They certainly overlap with countries formerly colonized by France more so than they do
with Anglo-American nations, yet undoubtedly less than they do with each other. For in-
stance, some of the key legal institutions, such as the writ of protection (or amparo), prevail
in the Iberian American realm, but not in its Franco-American counterpart.
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entitlements, which generally pertain to society as a whole. The for-
mer rights, which one might also denominate "communal" or "micro-
collective," include, for example, those of the inmates of a prison to
constitutional incarceration conditions and those of all consumers of
tobacco to compensation for ensuing injuries to their health. The lat-
ter rights, which one might additionally term "societal" or "macro-
collective," encompass, for instance, those of the entire population to
a safe environment and those of the citizenry to a fair counting of
their votes in an election. This contrast parallels, though only imper-
fectly, that between second- and third-generation entitlements.4 For
present purposes, the adjectives "collective," "trans-individual,"
"meta-individual" and "representative" not only share a wider range
of application than the two categories just distinguished, but also en-
compass both of them as subsets.
Latin American nations have taken an initial, almost rhetori-
cal step by constitutionally recognizing a new set of substantive mi-
cro-collective and macro-collective guaranties. They have then con-
solidated this shift by creating procedural means to breathe life into
these norms. This essay predominantly pores over this second move.
Specifically, the argument advanced demonstrates how Ibe-
rian American legal systems-most conspicuously, that of Brazil-
have taken the idea of trans-individual entitlements and processes,
mainly from the United States, and radically transformed it. They
have established causes of action inspired by the U.S. class action,
but based on autochthonous institutions, in order creatively to process
group rights. Additionally, they have designed procedural means for
the vindication of comprehensive guarantees.
Latin American jurisdictions have often empowered non-
governmental organizations and individuals to defend communal, as
well as societal, rights in court. They have also vested this preroga-
tive in independent state entities, such as public ministries,5 which
have taken on a paramount role in this area. This paper calls for a
consolidation and intensification of these efforts.
The U.S. legal world has much to learn from the transforma-
tion taking place in the southern continent. It could, first, put forth a
new provision to enable any concerned person or association to vin-
4. See infra Part II for further discussion of this matter.
5. Part IV introduces the Public Ministry as an autonomous state institution in charge,
throughout Latin America, of defending the public interest in and out of court.
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dicate comprehensive entitlements through a universally available
citizen's suit. It could, second, institute an autonomous state body,
along the lines of the Procurator General's Office,6 with power to file
complaints on behalf of communal, as well as societal, interests.
Third, U.S. rule-making authorities could grant standing to organiza-
tions as well as individuals to pursue class suits. They could, finally,
re-engineer and enhance Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure by positing a single, straightforward classification under 23(b).
A complete analysis of these suggestions would, of course, outrun the
limits of the endeavor at hand.
After this introduction, Part II will probe into the concept of
collective litigation and place it in comparative perspective. Part III
will present the collective writ of protection as an instrument for the
implementation of group rights and recommend that, beyond associa-
tions, individuals also have the right to initiate such litigation. Part
IV, in turn, will discuss the popular action as a procedural device
through which individuals may realize certain comprehensive enti-
tlements. It will propose enlarging the scope of the suit to incorpo-
rate all such rights and permitting organizations to sue. Further, Part
V will explore the deployment of public civil actions by the public
ministry to enforce micro- and macro-collective entitlements. It will
support streamlining the procedure by defining the safeguarded guar-
antees less rigidly and by expanding the preclusion effects. Parts III,
IV and V will advocate, on similar grounds, the imposition of an
adequacy-of-representation requirement on each one of these suits.
Part VI will recommend specific changes to U.S. law inspired by
these three procedural actions, along the lines traced in the previous
paragraph. Finally, Part VII will conclude, ultimately pointing to and
reflecting upon the still-existing impediments to the realization of
collective rights in the southern continent.
This investigation is part of a larger project, which identifies a
set of remarkable accomplishments in the Iberian American struggle
for rights and envisions a brighter future. The successes in question
are the vigorous enforcement of positive entitlements, the creation of
key specialized procedures and the domestication of international
guarantees. The underlying and unprecedented theoretical premise is
that one must consider rights integrally or organically and analyze
not only negative, substantive and national entitlements, but also
6. As explained in Part IV, the Procurator General heads the Public Ministry.
[47:248
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their positive, procedural and international counterparts.
The following study scrutinizes one of the special procedures
that have emerged for the implementation of legal entitlements. The
mechanism under scrutiny, i.e., the meta-individual suit, has attained
prominence partly-and somewhat paradoxically-as a way to com-
pensate for the deficiencies of ordinary process. It thus resembles
other causes of action, such as the writ of protection or the unconsti-
tutionality claim.7
This paper does not ignore, but rather calls attention to, the
defects of the structures under consideration. It unfolds, moreover, in
full awareness that Latin American law generally operates against an
adverse backdrop of weak adherence to paramount ideals such as the
rule of law, democracy, personal freedom, and solidarity. The
achievements at stake, consequently, face a constant threat. The con-
clusion of this piece will examine these issues. It will suggest ways
to address these all-but-impossible challenges and will insist, in the
spirit of Paul Gauguin, on keeping paradise in sight despite the hell-
ish conditions occasionally found in situ.8 Nonetheless, a full exami-
nation of this most complex problem would require considerably
more deliberation and will therefore have to wait for a later moment.
II. COLLECTIVE LITIGATION: CONCEPT AND COMPARATIVE
CONTEXT
Unlike the amparo or writ of protection,9 the Latin American
collective action did not originate indigenously. Instead, it mostly
emerged abroad, eventually migrated to Iberian America and ulti-
mately underwent an idiosyncratic development there. It thus resem-
bles the local unconstitutionality suit, although the latter has its roots
mainly in Continental Europe and the former principally in the
United States.
On first impression, the phrase "collective lawsuit" merely
suggests litigation involving multiple plaintiffs. From this perspec-
7. Part III discusses further the writ of protection, a specialized mechanism for the
vindication of constitutional and other rights, as well as the unconstitutionality suit, an action
through which courts conduct abstract judicial review.
8. See GAUGUIN, infra note 150, and accompanying text.
9. Part III will further discuss this institution, which was introduced in note 7 and ac-
companying text.
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tive, a complaint filed jointly by two individuals would fall under the
category. In Latin America, the term "litisconsorcio," in both Span-
ish and Portuguese, points etymologically to a "consortium in litiga-
tion" and refers to a scenario in which various parties litigate to-
gether. It encompasses aggregations of not only plaintiffs, but also
defendants. The litigants may be part of the group from the outset or
may enter the suit through necessary or permissive joinder.' 0
This article deploys the expression "collective action" in a
different sense. It examines lawsuits that affect the rights of a multi-
plicity of individuals who, for the most part, never actually appear in
court. These absent beneficiaries may even be unaware that the pro-
ceedings are taking place.
These representative causes of action break down into two
subcategories: group suits and comprehensive suits. The former
concentrate on the rights of a determinate, though potentially huge,
micro-collectivity, such as the student body of a college or the vic-
tims of asbestosis. The latter focus on the entitlements of a virtually
boundless macro-collectivity, viz., society as a whole, with respect to
environmental, developmental, or other matters. Even though these
classifications defy any precise definition and overlap considerably,
they point to real and crucial distinctions.
The rights at stake roughly correspond to what Karel Vagk
famously denominates second- and third-generation rights." First-
and second-generation rights are associated, respectively, with the
1966 United Nations' International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.' 2 They encom-
pass, on the one hand, mainly individual entitlements such as equal-
ity, due process, privacy, free speech, liberty of association, as well
as universal suffrage, and, on the other hand, mostly group rights to
work, to unionize, to subsistence, to housing, to health, to education
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 19; FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
11. Karel Vagik, Les difftrentes cat~gories des droits de 1'homme, in 1 LES
DIMENSIONS UNIVERSELLES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 297 (Andr& Lapeyre, Francois de Tinguy
& Karel Vagdk eds., 1990); see also Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection
of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1982).
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (the provisions of article 41 (Human Rights Commit-
tee) entered into force Mar. 28, 1979); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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and to culture. Third-generation rights, in turn, are basically com-
prehensive entitlements that have gained recognition subsequently
and that regard matters such as self-determination, environment, de-
velopment, and information.' 3
The two categorizations -i.e., by breadth of impact, from in-
dividual to societal, and by generational identification, from first- to
third-generation-coincide only partially. Some second-generation
guaranties, such as the right to health, most frequently take a societal
form. Certain third-generation entitlements, like consumer rights,
most commonly affect a determinate collectivity. These key diver-
gences notwithstanding, the two conceptual schemes help illuminate
each other.
The U.S. class action constitutes a micro-collective procedure
par excellence. A few individuals act as representatives of an ex-
tended group and thus bind their fellow class members. They must
show, inter alia, that their claims are typical and that they will ade-
quately represent everyone else in the class.'
4
The class suit is an age-old creature of equity procedure
within the common-law tradition. 15  It attained prominence in the
United States in the second half of the twentieth century as a means
to compensate mass tort victims and reform public institutions. It
faced considerable backlash in the 1970s, as opponents criticized the
judicial implementation of these ends and claimed that rampant abuse
had taken place.1 6 This challenge, which continues to this day, has
led to key modifications in the text and interpretation of the relevant
rule. 17 Nonetheless, the class action remains a crucial device for the
13. See generally Jack Donnelly, Third Generation Rights, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, 134-37 (Catherine Brolmann, Rene Lefeber & Marjoleine
Zieck eds., 1993).
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
15. Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 833 (1999) ("[C]lass actions as we recognize
them today developed as an exception to the formal rigidity of the necessary parties rule in
equity... as well as from the bill of peace, an equitable device for combining multiple
suits."); Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) ("Rule 23, governing federal-court
class actions, stems from equity practice and gained its current shape in an innovative 1966
revision.").
16. See Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE. L.
REv. 21, 30 (1996) ("In the 1970s and 1980s, American politics and American law moved to
the Right, and, in that climate, the class action became a frequent target of conservative
forces.").
17. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted procedural rules and statutes restrictively
with respect to class actions. See generally Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (prohibit-
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vindication of group rights.
In the United States, an association-such as a union, club or
political party-may have an impact similar to that of class delegates
when it litigates on behalf of its membership. It must first show, ac-
cording to the U.S. Supreme Court, that "its members would have
standing to sue in their own right," that "the interests at stake are
germane to the organization's purpose" and that "neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires individual members' par-
ticipation in the lawsuit."' 8 The judgment generally binds the mem-
bership, except in cases of inadequacy of representation. 19
The government and its agencies, such as the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, may also seek class-wide remedies in
the United States. z° In these suits, however, the final decision usually
does not preclude subsequent litigation by the individual claimants.
The U.S. Supreme Court justifies this restriction, at least in labor dis-
crimination cases, by pointing to a legislative "intent to accord paral-
lel or overlapping remedies" and to "the possible differences between
ing the aggregation of members' claims in diversity class actions in order to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement); Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding
that each member in diversity class actions must meet the amount-in-controversy prerequi-
site); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (requiring 23(b)(3) class action rep-
resentatives to notify all members individually and to pay the entire cost of notification);
Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (insisting on strict compliance with the adequacy
of representation and predominance of commonality requirements in 23(b)(3) settlement
class actions); Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (requiring representatives in a set-
tlement 23(b)(1)(B) class action clearly to prove the fund's limit and to address any conflict-
ing interest among members). Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have increased the appellate supervision of class certification decisions, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f)
(amended 1998), as well as the trial court's control over appointment and compensation of
class counsel, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g), (h) (amended 2003), and granted dissident members the
right to object and a new opportunity opt out vis-d-vis settlement proposals, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e) (amended 2003). Furthermore, the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act authorizes removal
from state courts of class actions that satisfy minimal diversity requirements and that seek
more than $5,000,000 in damages. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1332(d) (2006). Finally, Congress
enacted special restrictions on representative plaintiffs and attorneys in securities class ac-
tions. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z- 1 (2000).
18. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
19. If an association does not "represent adequately the interests of all their injured
members. .. ,a judgment won against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the asso-
ciation's members without offending due process principles." Int'l Union v. Brock, 477
U.S. 274, 290 (1986).
20. See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation ", 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
35 (Summer 1991) ("Aggregate litigation also occurs when statutes authorize a government
official to pursue litigation on behalf of a group. A myriad of federal statutes create such
opportunities.").
[47:248
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the public and private interests involved., 21  A further justification
might rest on the fact that these state litigants may sue for the benefit
of individuals with conflicting interests and, accordingly, inade-
quately represent the ultimate beneficiaries.
2 2
Historically, the European Continent has not experienced
quite as much pressure to attain the same compensatory and reforma-
tive objectives through the law, partly because it has a more solid so-
cial insurance system and has thus far confronted less extreme crises
within its educational, correctional and other structures than the
United States.23 In contrast, Iberian America has fared even worse
on these fronts than its northern neighbor. For example, it has run
into greater problems of insufficient indemnification for widespread
injuries, inhumane prison conditions and unequal access to education.
Nonetheless, when it has responded at all, it has traditionally done so
politically rather than judicially. 24
As a result, group suits have historically played a relatively
modest role in Continental Europe and Latin America. Legal reform-
21. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)).
22. The U.S. justices have noted, for example, that "the EEOC is authorized to proceed
in a unified action and to obtain the most satisfactory overall relief even though competing
interests are involved and particular groups may appear to be disadvantaged." Id. at 331.
23. See James A. Morone, Political Accountability: The Bias of American Politics:
Rationing Health Care In A Weak State, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1923, 1925 (1992) ("Americans
developed their social insurance programs far more reluctantly than did most Western de-
mocracies. In Europe, benefits were generally proffered from the political center by states-
men bidding for the allegiance of workers."); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 136 (1987)
("Throughout Western Europe today it is taken for granted that governments are responsible
for public welfare; that they insure health employment, and retirement; and that they will do
so at more than minimal levels.").
24. In Brazil, for instance, the most conspicuous attempt to address the unconstitution-
ality of incarceration conditions was a presidential decree, Decreto No. 1.904, de 13 de Maio
de 1996, D.O. de 14.05.1996 (Braz.), while Sdo Paulo authorities headed the effort to obtain
compensation from the airline TAM after the deadly accident of July 2007. See Elaine
Patricia Cruz, Cinco meses ap6s acidente com avido da TAM, parentes ainda esperam
indenizaq3es, AGiNCIA BRASIL, Dec. 21, 2007, available at http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.
br/noticias/2007/12/17/materia.2007-12-17.8479365035/view. The federal government, in
turn, sent a law to Congress in order to regulate the reparations to victims in future air ca-
lamities. See Leonel Rocha, Governo quer crit~rios pra indenizar vitimas, CORREIO
BRAZILIENSE, Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://pfdc.pgr.mpf.gov.br/clipping/fevereiro-
2008/govemo-quer-criterios-pra-indenizar-vitimas. The Mexican endeavor to confront edu-
cational discrimination against indigenous peoples through legislation, rather than litigation,
provides another example. See Ley Federal Para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminaci6n [Fe-
deral Law to Prevent & Eliminate Discrimination], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.],
11 de Junio de 2003 (Mex.).
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ists in both regions, however, have recently started calling for
change. In particular, they have propounded the broad use of collec-
tive litigation to implement not only civil, political, social and eco-
nomic liberties, but also third-generation rights in areas such as envi-
ronmental and consumer law. Of course, they have tended to endorse
not class actions per se, which are foreign to the civil law universe,
2 5
but rather functional equivalents either derived from pre-existing
mechanisms or created from scratch.
The Old World has principally responded by authorizing
group litigation. A 1998 European Parliament and Council directive,
for example, calls for the entitlement of "independent public bodies"
and private organizations to seek injunctions for "the protection of
the collective interests of consumers. ',26 Iberian American jurisdic-
tions, in turn, have often gone much further and enabled the vindica-
tion of communal, as well as societal, claims. In this effort, they
have opened up at least three different possibilities. First, individuals
or organizations may seek a "collective" writ of protection against
violations of the rights of a larger collectivity.27 (In the context of
this paper, one could actually denominate this device "micro-
collective," as it envisages a societal subgroup.) Second, citizens
may file popular actions, which stem from Roman law, in order to
defend public assets in the name of the population as a whole.28
Third, public ministries, associations and sometimes ordinary people
may initiate the increasingly prevalent and U.S.-inspired public civil
actions for the judicial enforcement of comprehensive and group
rights.
29
25. Of course, Puerto Rico and Qu6bec constitute exceptions. These two civil law ju-
risdictions under U.S. and Anglo-Canadian influence, respectively, allow class litigation.
See P.R. R. Civ. P. 20; Qu6bec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., ch. C-25, 999-1026 (Can.).
26. See Council Directive 98/27, arts. 3, 1(1), 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (EC).
27. See Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985. (Braz.);
Resoluci6n Ministerial No. 10-93-JUS, 8 Jan. 1993, Texto Unico Ordenado del C6digo
Prosecal Civil (Peru); Ley No. 15.982, 18 Oct. 1988, C6digo General del Proceso (Uru.).
28. See CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL DE 1988 [hereinafter
BRAz. CONST.] art. 5(LXXIII); CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991 art. 88
[hereinafter COLOM. CONST.]; CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA art.
203(2) [hereinafter PAN. CONST.]; CONSTITUC16N POLiTICA DEL PERt art. 200(5) [hereinafter
PERU CONST.].
29. Only Brazilians use the term "public civil action." Other Latin Americans speak
loosely of "comprehensive interests" actions. See, e.g., Resoluci6n Ministerial No. 10-93-
JUS, 8 Jan. 1993, Texto Unico Ordenado del C6digo Procesal Civil (Peru); Ley No. 15.982,
18 Oct. 1988, C6digo General del Proceso (Uru.).
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The initiative in this realm has mostly stemmed from the leg-
islature, yet the judiciary has occasionally acted on its own. For in-
stance, some tribunals south of the border have created, sua sponte
and in the absence of any enabling legislation, a joint writ of protec-
tion. For instance, the Argentine Supreme Court established in Ek-
mekdjidn v. Sofovich that a plaintiff may assert the right of reply on
behalf of many individuals profoundly offended by a statement in the
media. 30  Similarly, in Cruz del Valle Bermtidez v. Ministerio de
Sanidady Asistencia Social [Ministry of Health and Social Welfare],
Venezuela's highest tribunal allowed a substantial number of indi-
gent patients with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) to sue on behalf of
all similarly situated victims of the disease in order to force the gov-
ernment to provide necessary treatment.
31
As already suggested, Latin America has revolutionized col-
lective litigation by embracing not only communal procedures but
also societal actions. In contrast, U.S. law permits the latter only un-
der limited circumstances, not generally. As explained in Part IV,
some federal statutes authorize citizen suits, which enable personally
affected plaintiffs to assert the public's interest through litigation.32
Similarly, qui tam actions empower individuals only to challenge
specific conduct that injures society as a whole, such as the embez-
zlement of state monies. 33 The U.S. legal system does not feature a
30. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/7/1992, "Ekmekdjifn, Miguel Angel c. Sofo-
vich, Gerardo y otros / derecho de replica, acci6n de amparo, queja por denegaci6n de recur-
so extraordinario, tratados y convenios internacionales," La Ley [L.L.] (1992-C-542) (Arg.),
translated and reprinted in ANGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 242-58 (2006).
31. Cruz del Valle Bermfidez v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Sala
Politico-Administrativa, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Repfiblica de Venezuela, Expediente
N6mero: 15,789 (1999), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 335-45.
32. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1365 (2000); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000); Clayton Antitrust Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
33. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000); Vermont Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n. 1 (2000) ("Qui tam is
short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,
which means 'who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own.'
The phrase dates from at least the time of Blackstone. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES * 160. Three other qui tam statutes, all also enacted over 100 years ago, re-
main on the books. See 25 U.S.C. § 81 (providing cause of action and share of recovery
against a person contracting with Indians in an unlawful manner); § 201 (providing cause of
action and share of recovery against a person violating Indian protection laws); 35 U.S.C. §
292(b) (providing cause of action and share of recovery against a person falsely marking
patented articles); cf 18 U.S.C. § 962 (providing for forfeiture to informer of share of ves-
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statute or a federal rule that broadly enables private parties to sue
whenever universally shared interests are at stake.
Iberian American nations have also deviated from the U.S.
model to the extent that they have created autonomous state entities
and have authorized them, inter alia, to file micro- and macro-
collective actions. The European Union has followed a similar path
insofar as it has called for the enforcement of consumer suits by "in-
dependent public bodies." 34 The United States, for its part, occasion-
ally entrusts the implementation of group and comprehensive claims
to officials and agencies that work at the behest of the administration
in power.
Table 1 contrasts collective procedures in the United States
and Latin America on the basis of their scope and of the initiating
plaintiff. The categories will become more familiar, and conse-
quently clearer, as the discussion unfolds. Individuals vindicate
group claims through class actions in the North and through collec-
tive writs of protection or security in the South. Organizations do the
same through associational suits in the United States and through col-
lective writs in Iberian America.35 U.S. governmental agencies, such
as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and self-standing Latin American public
ministries may also defend the interests of micro-collectivities,
through agency class litigation and public civil actions, respectively.
Table 1. U.S. v. Latin American Collective Procedures Organized
by Scope and by Litigant
Scope/Litigant Individual Organization State Entity
Class Action v. Associational Suit Agency ClassGroup Suit Collective Writ v. Collective Writ Litigation v. Public
Civil Action
Comprehensive Citizen Suit; Citizen Suit; Agency EnforcementAction qui tam v. qui tam v. Suit v. Public Civil
Popular Action Popular Action Action
sels privately armed against friendly nations, but not expressly authorizing suit by informer);
46 U.S.C. § 723 (providing for forfeiture to informer of share of vessels removing undersea
treasure from the Florida coast to foreign nations, but not expressly authorizing suit by in-
former).").
34. See Council Directive 98/27, arts. 3, 1(1), 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (EC).
35. As previously noted, Brazilian non-governmental organizations may also file pub-
lic civil actions.
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With regard to comprehensive claims, individuals and organi-
zations in the United States may exceptionally file citizen suits or qui
tam actions,36 as defined by specific statutes, while their Iberian
American neighbors may set in motion the more wide-ranging popu-
lar action.37  U.S. administrative agencies, like the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of Justice, may launch en-
forcement procedures, while Latin American public ministries may
commence public civil actions. The southern entities, due to their
autonomy, are usually in a better position than their northern coun-
terparts to litigate against the interests or wishes of the government.
In Latin America, Brazil has taken the lead in collective liti-
gation in general. Since the 1980s, it has recognized a wide array of
meta-individual causes of action. It has thus created a paradigm that
has drawn significant attention throughout the continent. Many Ibe-
rian American nations have already produced statutes or legislative
bills on the matter, but none of them has gone as far as Brazil in
terms of the quantity and quality of the options available.
Latin American juridical systems will most certainly undergo
substantial transmutations in this area over the next decade. They
will have to find their own way, learning from foreign law without
blindly imitating it. Specifically, legal actors in the region should
continue to push beyond a narrow, group-rights focus, in order to at-
tend to comprehensive entitlements. Ultimately, they will have to
come to appreciate and embrace the law's capacity effectively to re-
alize crucial public values and radically to reconfigure societal rela-
tions.
36. U.S. organizations regularly bring citizen suits, see, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), and may act as the "private per-
son" entitled to file the qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006). See United States ex
rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 998 F. Supp. 971, 983 (E.D. Wis. 1998) ("[T]here is no
case law to suggest that legal entities such as corporations are precluded from maintaining
qui tam actions. Law firms have brought successful qui tam suits under the FCA, as have
state attorneys general on behalf of individual states.").
37. An Iberian American association would have to encourage someone from its mem-
bership to take the role of the "citizen" initiating the popular action. BRAz. CONST. art.
5(LXXIII). In Brazil, it could, alternatively, file a public civil action to enforce comprehen-
sive rights.
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III. COLLECTIVE WRITS OF PROTECTION OR SECURITY
The individual writ of protection developed in Mexico in the
nineteenth century in order to enable private parties to claim their le-
gal entitlements. It has gradually and steadily taken hold in other
Iberian American legal systems and now exists throughout the conti-
nent, from Tijuana to Tierra del Fuego.38 Most countries, like Mex-
ico, denominate this action "amparo,"39 a word that means protection
or shelter. The Colombian Constitution uses, instead, the term "tu-
tela,'4 ° which translates into "guardianship" or "defense," while the
Chilean charter opts for the phrase "recurso de protecci6n," or (liter-
ally) "protection recourse." The Brazilian Constitution, in turn,
speaks of a "mandado de seguranqa," i.e., "security mandate. 42
Even though the name varies, the underlying procedure re-
mains essentially the same. It enables claimants to vindicate summa-
rily fundamental rights. The court must give priority to these cases
and apply a special set of procedural rules. Moreover, the decision
38. See CONSTITUCION DE LA NACION ARGENTINA § 43 [hereinafter ARG. CONST.];
CONSTITUCIN POLiTICA DEL ESTADO DE BOLIVIA art. 19; BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXIX);
CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE art. 20 [hereinafter CHILE CONST.];
COLOM. CONST. art. 86; CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA art. 48;
CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR art. 95 [hereinafter ECUADOR
CONST.]; CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUJBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 247; CONSTITUCIN
POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA art. 265; CONSTITUCIN POLITICA DE LA
REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS art. 183; CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MEXICANOS [hereinafter MEX. CONST.], art. 103(I), amended by, Diario Oficial de la Federa-
ci6n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE
NICARAGUA art. 188; PAN. CONST. art. 50; CONSTITUCION DE LA REPOBLICA DEL PARAGUAY
art. 134 [hereinafter PARA. CONST.]; PERU CONST. art. 200(2); Ley No. 16.011, 19 Dec. 1988,
Accion de Amparo, Diario Oficial de la Rep6blica Oriental del Uruguay [D.O.], 29 Dec.
1988 (Uru.); CONSTITUCIN DE LA REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA art. 27 [hereinaf-
ter VENEZ. CONST.]. In the Dominican Republic, the Supreme Court recognized the writ on
February 24, 1999. Productos Avon, Inc. v. 2nd Ch., Labor Ct., Nat. Dist. [Sup. Ct.] (Dom.
Rep.) (1999). The Cuban Constitution does not recognize the writ, but rather a generic
"right to address complaints and petitions to the authorities and to receive a reasonably
timely response, according to the law." CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA art. 63.
Finally, Puerto Rico's constitutional charter, which essentially reproduces its U.S. counter-
part, does not provide for a protection suit. Consequently, Puerto Ricans vindicate their
rights through ordinary civil complaints.
39. See MEX. CONST., art. 107, as amended, D.O., 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
40. COLOM. CONST. art. 86.
41. CHILE CONST. art. 20. Curiously, Chilean lawyers use the word "amparo" to de-
nominate the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., JORGE MARIO QUINZIO FIGUEIREDO, JUSTICIA
CONSTITUCIONAL EN CHILE 78-79 (2000).
42. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LXIX).
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typically concerns only the litigants. Consequently, the judge may
hold the challenged act or law unconstitutional in the case at hand but
does not establish a precedent. Another individual subsequently fac-
ing a similar situation would have to re-litigate the issue. She may
naturally cite the precedin3 opinion as a source of persuasive reasons,
but not as a binding norm.
Of course, the details vary enormously from one country to
the next. In Argentina and Brazil, for instance, the proceeding un-
folds strictly summarily and admits exclusively documentary proof.
44
The tribunal basically treats the request for the writ as a motion for
summary judgment. In Mexico and most other jurisdictions, the par-
ties may introduce all kinds of evidence, including testimony. Fur-
thermore, Latin American systems diverge on matters such as
whether the suit lies only against state action, whether it applies
solely to constitutional rights and whether it admits challenges to ju-
dicial decisions. Finally, Argentina and Paraguay, unlike the rest of
their regional neighbors, generally authorize judges to invalidate un-
constitutional statutes in these causes.45
Many Latin American jurisdictions have established a collec-
tive writ of protection or security.46 A plaintiff may request such a
43. See, e.g., Ley de amparo, reglamentaria de los articulos 103 y 107 de la Constitu-
cion politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Amparo Law], art. 76, D.O., 10 de Enero de
1936 (Mex.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 267: "The protection
judgment shall concern only the claimants, whether individuals, private entities, or public
officials. It shall restrict itself to protecting them in the context of the specific case referred
to in the complaint. It shall not make a general declaration with respect to the challenged
law or action." The Mexican Supreme Court, however, may issue case law in these contro-
versies after consecutively deciding the same issue in five opinions in a row and through a
super majority either of eight out of the Plenum's eleven justices or, alternatively, of four out
of a Chamber's five justices. See id. art. 192, translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra
note 30, at 267 ("Supreme Court holdings shall constitute case law if supported by five con-
secutive, uninterrupted decisions, which at least eight justices of the Plenum or four justices
of the competent Chamber have approved."). Mexico's Courts of Appeals may also estab-
lish binding precedents. See id. art. 193, translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note
30, at 267 ("The holdings of circuit court panels shall constitute case law if supported by
five consecutive, uninterrupted, and unanimous decisions.").
44. The Argentine Writ of Protection Act declares the action inadmissible "whenever
determining the alleged invalidity of the act would require broad argumentation or introduc-
tion of evidence." Law No. 16986, art. 2(b), Oct. 18, 1966, B.O. 20-X-1966. Brazil's Con-
stitution, in turn, establishes that the writ lies to protect "summarily and clearly ascertain-
able" entitlements. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXIX).
45. ARG. CONST. art. 43; CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [C6D. PROC. CIV.] art. 582 (Para.).
46. See, e.g., BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LXX); ECUADOR CONST. art. 95; MEX. CONST. arts.
2(A)(VIII) (indigenous rights), 107(11) (communal agrarian rights), as amended (Mex.);
PAPA. CONST. art. 38; VENEZ. CONST. art. 26; Decreto 2591 de 1991, art. 6(3), 19 Nov. 1991,
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writ in order to protect the prerogatives of an entire group. In Brazil,
for example, political parties, unions and organizations have stand-
ing, yet a person on her own does not. 47 Argentina's 1994 Constitu-
tion empowers, on the one hand, "individuals affected" and, on the
other hand, the "People's Defender" to file such actions.48 It thus
creates the equivalent of a U.S. class action and a Brazilian micro-
collective public civil action, respectively. In other words, one or
several representatives or an independent public organ 49 may initiate
a collective "defense of environment, competition, and consumer
rights, as well as collective rights more generally." 50 Of course, both
Argentine and Brazilian plaintiffs must make their case mostly on the
basis of written evidence, inasmuch as they are pursuing, respec-
tively, a writ of protection and a writ of security under the applicable
local rules. In most other Iberian American jurisdictions, however,
complainants may additionally rely on other means of proof.
Not surprisingly, Latin American organizations have taken
advantage of this implementation mechanism and have forced the ju-
diciary to detail the procedural parameters. In FEBRAC v. Presidente
da Reptiblica, for instance, the Brazilian Federation of Syndicates
and Associations of Maintenance and Conservation Companies
(FEBRAC) sought a collective writ of security on behalf of its mem-
bership against the federal executive. 51 It challenged "Law 8.800 of
May 27, 1994, and Provisory Measure 635 of September 27, 1994,
[which established] the Program of Economic Stability, the National
Monetary System, and the Institution of the Currency Real Unit of
Value (RUV). 52 The plaintiff contended that the change of the offi-
cial currency from cruzeiros to reais under these provisions violated
the contractual rights of its constituents. It argued, in essence, that
the value of the contracts under consideration decreased as a conse-
quence of the conversion statute.
The Brazilian Supreme Court dismissed the suit, accusing the
Por el cual se reglarnenta la acci6n de tutela consagrada en el articulo 86 de la Constituci6n
Politica (Colom.); Ley No. 7135, art. 67, 11 Oct. 1989, Ley de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucio-
nal, D.O., 19 Oct. 1989 (Costa Rica).
47. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LXX).
48. ARG. CONST. art. 43.
49. Id. art. 86.
50. Id. art. 43.
51. FEBRAC v. Presidente da Rep6blica, S.T.F., MS-22132, Relator: Min. Velloso,
21.8.1996 (Braz.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 721-25.
52. Id.
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complainant of illegitimately purporting to use the writ of security
against a law in the abstract, instead of against a concrete act of im-
plementation. The justices explained that this kind of claim had to
take place through an unconstitutionality action.53 They thus not
only construed the writ of security most restrictively but also left the
petitioners with no options. The statute of limitations for an uncon-
stitutionality complaint had most likely already run out and, in any
case, the plaintiff did not fall within the limited category of parties
that may file such a suit. Article 103 of Brazil's Constitution permits
only the president, the legislature, state governors, the procurator
general, the Brazilian Bar Association, political parties and national
unions to contest abstractly the constitutionality of statutes.54
Prior to the settlement of the merits, the FEBRAC Court first
had to decide whether the plaintiff had standing. The association at
stake was not appearing for itself, but rather on behalf of its mem-
bers. It purported to defend their collective, rather than their individ-
ual, interests. Under the Constitution, it had to be "legally organized
and in operation for at least one year ' 55 in order to proceed.
The summary of the opinion in FEBRAC reads: "Unions,
classes, and associations have extraordinary standing to request a
[collective] writ of security." 56 The Court specifically held that these
entities did not need "express authorization" from their membership
and that "procedural substitution [took] place. 57 It accordingly let
the plaintiff represent its members' joint interests, to stand in for
them procedurally, and to bind them without explicitly consulting
them.
Consequently, a collective security process launched by an
association differs from an ordinary organizational action, in which
the decision for or against the organization usually does not bind the
members, unless they appear as co-plaintiffs or intervenors. Of
course, in the latter kind of procedure, as in the former, the judgment
normally has an impact on subsequent litigation. For instance, if
FEBRAC had lost in a regular suit instead of a collective security ac-
tion, the President could have invoked such judicial determination as
53. See generally id. (Opinion by Velloso, J.).
54. BRAz. CONST. art. 103.
55. Id. art. 5(LXX).
56. FEBRAC v. Presidente da Repi.blica, S.T.F., MS-22132, Relator: Min. Velloso,
21.8.1996 (Braz.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 721.
57. Id.
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a source of persuasive reasons, but not as res judicata, against any
complaint filed thereafter by particular maintenance companies. As
the litigation actually unfolded, he prevailed against the plaintiff's
petition for a collective writ and therefore would have been able to
preclude any subsequent individual suits.
Coincidentally, Article 5(XXI) of Brazil's Constitution cre-
ates a representative associational action that similarly binds mem-
bers of the plaintiff organization so long as they expressly authorize
the litigation. In AJURIS v. Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, the Su-
preme Court allowed the Association of Judges of Rio Grande do Sul
(AJURIS) to file such a suit on behalf of the entire membership, in-
asmuch as the group had secured majority approval in an extraordi-
nary meeting. The tribunal rejected the State's argument that the
complainant, which was seeking a cost-of-living adjustment on over-
due judicial salaries, could only represent those judges who had ex-
pressly and individually consented to the action.5 9 As a consequence
of this rejection, any member of AJURIS could have subsequently
demanded enforcement of the decision, which ultimately upheld the
claim, as resjudicata.
This type of associational action actually occupies a middle
point between the collective writ of security and an ordinary suit in
terms of its binding force. It differs from the former, which has an
automatic preclusive effect on the plaintiffs membership, as well as
from the latter, which demands individual consent in order to bind
the members. As noted above, the associates must authorize the liti-
gation filed under Article 5(XXI) not individually, but rather collec-
tively by majority vote, in order to set the suit in motion.
Of these three possibilities, the security suit resembles the
previously mentioned U.S. associational action the most. In light of
the extensive res judicata consequences, Brazilian judges should, de
legeferenda, consider adequacy of representation prior to the admis-
sion of a complaint under Article 5(LXX), for a collective writ of se-
curity, or under Article 5(XXI), for an authorized organizational ac-
tion. Of course, U.S. judges should do the same when confronted
with an associational suit purporting to preclude individual litigation
by the members.
58. AJURIS v. Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, S.T.F., AO-152, Relator: Min. Veltoso,
15.9.1999 (Braz.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 728-43.
59. Id.
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Occasionally, Latin American tribunals have, sua sponte and
without any legislative authorization, issued collective writs of pro-
tection for specific types of claims. For instance, before the estab-
lishment of the writ through the 1994 constitutional reform, Argen-
tina's Supreme Court determined in Ekmekdjidn v. Sofovich that a
plaintiff could assert the right of reply on behalf of many individuals
profoundly offended by a statement in the media. 60 The petitioner, a
prominent constitutional and international law professor and a devout
Catholic, objected to a television show, which featured some jokes
about Jesus and the Virgin Mary, as insulting to his faith and sought
an opportunity to respond on air. The judicial majority entitled him
to speak for himself and for others similarly upset by the televised
comic routine:
When someone exercises this right of reply to the
words of the offender, the remedial effect will doubt-
less benefit the entire group of those who feel equally
offended. The legislature-or the judiciary in case of
legislative neglect-should establish conditions for
the exercise of this right in order to preclude an end-
less number of responses. Unlike those who demand a
correction or reply to defend their personal and exclu-
sive rights, the person replying in cases such as the
one at hand becomes, in a sense, a collective represen-
tative. This person is entitled to undertake this repre-
sentation by virtue of being the first to bring the claim
to the offending broadcaster. The broadcaster will be
able to reject subsequent claims of the same or a simi-
lar nature simply by establishing that it has already
aired a remedial response.61
The opinion thus attempts to forestall the eruption of a myriad of
complaints each time the media offends widely shared religious be-
liefs. It prescribes that the first plaintiff person to sue be the only
party with standing and act as a representative of all other people
who feel similarly injured by the disseminated statements. It binds
60. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/7/1992, "Ekmekdjidn, Miguel Angel c. Sofo-
vich, Gerardo y otros / derecho de replica, acci6n de amparo, queja por denegaci6n de recur-
so extraordinario, tratados y convenios internacionales," La Ley [L.L.] (1992-C-542) (Arg.),
translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 242-58.
61. Id. 25.
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the "beneficiaries" to the original determination, if favorable to the
plaintiff.
While the spokesman in this controversy alleged that the con-
tested statements impinged upon him personally, he did not have to
show that he would adequately represent others. The latter could, ac-
cordingly, cry "foul" if they deemed his performance in court or in
the media unsatisfactory. Once again, the Argentine justices should
have demanded such a showing, perhaps in the manner of U.S. Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4).b2 If they had, the lawsuit in-
troduced would operate as a class action in the United States, inas-
much as it satisfies, ex hypothesis, the other three prerequisites under
the provision in question. In other words, the enormous number of
affected individuals would render joinder impracticable, there are
common questions of law and fact, and the litigant's claim resembles
those of everybody else.
63
Otherwise, this collective right-of-reply suit procedurally par-
allels class actions filed in the United States to obtain equitable relief,
since it seeks the equivalent of an injunction ordering the defendant
to enable the plaintiff to issue his or her response. It clearly di-
verges from U.S. class suits characterized by a predominance of
common factual issues, 65 inasmuch as it imposes no individual notifi-
cation prerequisite and does not allow dissidents to opt out.
6 6
In Venezuela, Cruz del Valle Berm~tdez v. Ministerio de Sani-
dad y Asistencia Social [Ministry of Health and Social Welfare] pro-
vides another case in point. 67 A number of indigent patients with
HIV and AIDS sued to force the government to provide necessary
treatment. The Supreme Court enjoined the authorities to afford the
prescribed medications not only to the numerous plaintiffs and inter-
venors, but also, "in light of the seriousness of the underlying public
health crisis,' ' 68 to any similarly situated Venezuelan citizen or resi-
dent. It thus converted, sub silentio, an ordinary writ of protection
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
63. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1)-(3).
64. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
67. Cruz del Valle Berm6dez v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Sala
Politico Administrativa, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Republica de Venezuela, Expediente
Numero: 15,789 (1999) (Venez.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at
335-45.
68. Id., Analysis (Right to Health, Life, and Access to Science and Technology).
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into a collective one.
The justices ultimately granted not only group relief, but also
a comprehensive remedy, insofar as they ordered the defendant to
adopt a wide-ranging preventive program. They made specific pro-
posals on this issue:
The state must develop a national prevention program
along the following lines:
" Educational programs to target vulnerable groups,
teenagers, married couples with problems, etc.
" Massive provision of information for the commu-
nity on the disease, its causes, its transmission, and
its prevention.
" Elaboration of a national plan to make affordable
diagnoses possible through the state's medical in-
stitutions.
Each of these programs requires special preparation
and implementation, taking into account matters such
as the general information currently available about
the disease, the adequate use of condoms, and the
availability of sterile syringes for drug users; the need
for special attention for vulnerable groups; the exist-
ing efforts at the level of the community; and the role
of marriage counseling.
69
"The goal must be," the tribunal insisted, "to develop a policy of pre-
vention based on facilitating information to individuals infected with
HIV/AIDS, as well as on raising their level of awareness, educating
them, and providing comprehensive assistance to them.",
70
Venezuela's 1999 Constitution created a new Supreme Court
(Tribunal Supremo de Justicia),71 which soon faced additional claims
by HIV/AIDS patients. In L6pez v. Instituto Venezolano de los Segu-
ros Sociales [Venezuelan Institute for Social Security], a multiplicity
of infected contributors filed a complaint against the Institute for So-
cial Security for failing to pay and deliver prescribed medicines.72
The new tribunal, through its Constitutional Chamber, echoed its
69. Id.
70. Id., Decision (3).
71. See VENEZ. CONST. art. 253.
72. L6pez v. Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales, Sala Constitucional, Tribu-
nal Supremo de Justicia, Expediente Numero: 1,343 (2001) (Venez.), translated and re-
printed in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 346-49.
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predecessor when it found that the defendant had "violated the right
to health, threatened the right to life, and encroached upon the right
to benefit from scientific and technological progress.",7' The Court
similarly rejected the contention that lack of funds or credits might
justify the Institute's inaction.74
This time, the justices stated that they had recently created
and that they would now grant, ex proprio motu, the collective writ of
protection:
Even though statutory law does not recognize a judi-
cial action to vindicate collective entitlements or in-
terests and plaintiffs therefore did not file such a suit
in the case at bar, the complaint actually calls for the
safeguard of a collective right, i.e., that of the ag-
grieved parties. We treat this claim as a petition for a
collective writ of protection, which this Chamber gen-
erally authorized in [Defensoria del Pueblo v. Co-
misi6n Legislativa Nacional, Exp. No. 1728,] on June
30, 2000.
The opinion even acknowledges the shift from a micro- to a macro-
collective procedure:
Such a collective or comprehensive writ may benefit,
on the one hand, an aggregation of people that is
clearly identifiable as a social group or, on the other
hand, an a priori indeterminate multiplicity of indi-
viduals that becomes determinate through the specific
legal situation and violation faced by the members.76
The procedural device in question resembles, in this sense, a public
civil action.
The collective writ of protection could potentially play an
enormous role in the realization of entitlements pertaining to the citi-
zenry as a whole or, at least, to a considerably large group of people.
73. Id., Considerations (II).
74. Id., Considerations (III).
75. Id., Considerations (IV).
76. Id. Presumably the Court did not have to create the collective writ of protection,
since it could have found it in Article 26 of the Constitution. VENEZ. CONST. art. 26 ("Every
person has a right to access the organs of justice for the protection of his or her entitlements
and interests, even if collective or comprehensive, to an effective defense of these goods,
and to obtain a prompt decision on the merits.").
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An organization to which most or all of the impacted individuals be-
long can normally best defend the rights at stake. Nonetheless, the
leadership may adopt a particular litigation strategy or choose not to
sue at all on the basis of its own priorities and against those of its
membership. The law should therefore empower members not only
to intervene but also to initiate the proceeding. The fact that there
may be no pre-existing association at hand also justifies permitting
any interested person to file a complaint. In any case, courts may si-
multaneously watch out for frivolous litigation, protect the concerns
of all and fully enforce the group rights at issue.
IV. POPULAR ACTIONS
Several Latin American jurisdictions have embraced the
popular action.77 The actio popularis, a creature of Roman law, en-
ables citizens to protect societal goods through the courts. U.S. law
contains, exceptionally, similar procedures. For instance, a few fed-
eral statutes authorize citizen suits, which enable personally affected
plaintiffs to assert the public's interest through litigation.78 Similarly,
qui tam actions empower individuals to challenge conduct that in-
jures society in general, such as the filing of "false claims." 79 Latin
American litigants, unlike their neighbors north of the border, 80 nor-
mally do not face strict standing requirements when bringing these
complaints.
Brazil's Constitution, for instance, allows citizens to sue any-
one who damages or misappropriates public property, as well as any
77. See BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LXXIII); COLOM. CONST. art. 88; PAN. CONST. art. 290;
PERU CONST. art. 200(5). Curiously, Panama's Constitution establishes a unique "popular
action to challenge in court any combination, contract, or action in support of monopolistic
practices." PAN. CONST. art. 290.
78. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1365 (2000); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000); Clayton Antitrust Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
79. See False Claims Act of 1863, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000); see also discussion
supra note 33.
80. The U.S. Supreme Court has strictly required an "injury-in-fact" in citizen suits,
such as under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000). See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992). Nonetheless, the tribunal has found an
"adequate basis for [a qui tam] suit ... in the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has stand-
ing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor," and concluded "that the United
States' injury in fact suffices to confer standing." Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773-74 (2000).
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public official who defiles "administrative morality, the environment,
or historical and cultural goods." 81 In these lawsuits, petitioners seek
to protect the interests of the entire citizenry. They have standing
merely by virtue of their citizenship. As in U.S. collective litiga-
82 '-83tion, the final judgment on the merits binds all other citizens. In
other words, if an individual subsequently files another popular ac-
tion, she will face dismissal on the basis of the principle of res judi-
cata.
Article 18 of the Popular Actions Act carves out an exception
when the court dismisses the suit for lack of proof.84  Under these
circumstances, it permits any citizen, including the original plaintiff,
to sue anew. In the United States, resjudicata rules on dismissal op-
erate in representative suits in the same ways as they do in other ac-
tions. The relevant precept reads thus: "Unless the dismissal order
states otherwise, a dismissal. . .---except one for lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, or failure to join a party under [compulsory join-
der]-operates as an adjudication on the merits."8 5 If the tribunal re-
jects the claim for insufficient evidence, it implicitly bars subsequent
81. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LXXIII).
82. See Harold J. Kent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizens Suits and Citizen Sunstein,
91 MICH. L. REv. 1793, 1814 n.79 (1993) These authors explain:
Citizen suits could have a res judicata effect under the theory that plaintiffs act-
ing in the capacity of private attorneys general are in privity with other plain-
tiffs acting in the same capacity. Otherwise, defendants might be subject to an
unlimited number of citizen suits for the same violations, at least until the
maximum liability for each violation [were] exhausted.
Id. See also Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984)
("There is ... no dispute that under elementary principles of prior adjudication a judgment
in a properly entertained class action is binding on class members in any subsequent litiga-
tion ... Basic principles of res judicata (merger and bar or claim preclusion) and collateral
estoppel (issue preclusion) apply."); United States ex rel. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gambler's
Supply, 925 F. Supp. 658, 667-68 (D.S.D. 1996). In Gambler's Supply, the district court
noted that
[t]he res judicata effect of a qui tam action was explained by Mr. Blackstone
who stated, 'But if any one hath begun a qui tam or popular action, no other
person can pursue it; and the verdict passed upon the defendant in the first suit
is a bar to all others, and conclusive even to the king himself'
Id. (quoting Miami Copper Co. v. State, 17 Ariz. 179, 188 (1915) (quoting Cooley's Black-
stone, Vol. 2, pp. 972, 973, 974)).
83. Lei No. 4.717, de 29 de Junho de 1965, art. 18, D.O.U. de 5.7.1965 (Braz.), trans-
lated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 713 ("The judgment shall constitute res
judicata, erga omnes .... ").
84. Id. ("The judgment shall constitute res judicata, erga omnes, except in cases of
dismissal for insufficiency of proof. Whenever this exception applies, any citizen may file
another action on the same grounds and introducing new evidence.").
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
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litigation, unless it makes an explicit statement to the contrary.
Ultimately, the Brazilian scheme may not operate as restric-
tively as it seems. If a judge wants to dismiss the suit with prejudice,
she must simply specify that the proof actually suffices to ascertain
that the petitioner has no case. The main difference between the Bra-
zilian framework and its U.S. counterpart is that the latter presumes
that dismissal for insufficiency of evidence precludes re-litigation,
while the former does not.
Brazilian plaintiffs in popular actions, unlike U.S. class repre-
sentatives, raise comprehensive (as opposed to group) claims. As al-
ready noted, they need not show a personal injury or an individual
stake in the controversy. Nor do they have to establish the adequacy
of their representation. They therefore do not have to face attempts
by defendants or courts to use these requirements to block legitimate
claims. At the same time, they do not have to prove that they will
litigate vigorously and responsibly before representing and binding
the public at large.
The relevant statute somewhat reduces the danger of anemic
or deficient litigation by compelling the participation of the Public
Ministry in all suits of this kind.86 This body will ordinarily contrib-
ute competent and objective plaintiff lawyers to the cause. It pos-
sesses considerable advocacy resources and enjoys both financial and
administrative autonomy vis-d-vis the government. 87 Its staff attor-
neys secure their prestigious, well-paid and life-tenured positions
upon a competitive selection process that includes a demanding spe-
cialized exam.88 They not only prosecute criminal cases and institute
public civil actions but also broadly safeguard constitutional rights.
89
The President appoints one of these prosecutors as "Procurator Gen-
eral" to head the institution for a renewable two-year term and must
secure the Senate's consent for the appointment as well as for a sub-
sequent removal. 90
The Public Ministry might not, however, adequately represent
the concerns of the citizenry. It may have its own particular agenda,
86. Lei No. 4.717, de 29 de Junho de 1965, art. 6(4), D.O.U. de 5.7.1965 (Braz.),
translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 713.
87. BRAz. CONST. art. 127(2).
88. See id. arts. 127(2), 128(1I)(5)(1).
89. See generally id. art. 129.
90. Id. arts. 52(III)(e), 52(XI), 84(XIV), 128(1I)(1)-(2).
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or it may defend the interests of some citizens at the expense of oth-
ers. Consequently, lawmakers should amend---or judges should per-
haps interpret-the law to require a determination of adequacy of
representation, as in U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4).
This approach would force the complainants and the Procurator Gen-
eral's office to demonstrate at the outset that all related claims will
have their day in court.
Brazil's constitutional Article 5(LXXIII) specifically relieves
popular action plaintiffs of court costs and, if they lose their case on
the merits, of automatic fee shifting. 9' If they litigate frivolously,
they have to pay the defendant's costs under Article 13 of the statute,
but not its counsel expenses. 92 Moreover, if they prevail, they may
demand that their opponent pay their attorney's fees under statutory
Article 12.93 By exempting popular action plaintiffs, but not defen-
dants, from the otherwise universally applicable "English Rule,"
which compels the losing party to pay the litigating expenses of her
prevailing adversary, 94 Brazilian law seeks to encourage this kind of
litigation.
Brazil's Supreme Court imposed key restrictions on this type
of suit in Paulo de Oliveira, Filho v. Tribunal Superior de Justiqa.
95
In this high-profile dispute, the Superior Justice Tribunal, second in
rank in the federal judicial hierarchy, reinstated the mayor of Sao
Paulo, who had been forced out of office on corruption charges.
Paulo de Oliveira, Filho, filed a popular action against the Tribunal
for allegedly acting as an accomplice to the mayor's corrupt dealings.
The Brazilian justices first resolved that they did not have
"original jurisdiction over popular actions" and suggested that only
trial courts did. They then described the kind of conduct that plain-
tiffs may challenge through these suits: "Popular actions aim exclu-
sively at administrative acts or omissions, irrespective of which insti-
91. Id. art. 5(LXXIII).
92. Lei No. 4.717, de 29 de Junho de 1965, art. 13, D.O.U. de 5.7.1965. (Braz.), trans-
lated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 713.
93. Id. art. 12, translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 713.
94. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 443 n.2 (1983) (The "'American Rule,'
under which the parties bear their own attorney's fees no matter what the outcome of a
case," differs from "the 'English Rule,' under which the losing party, whether plaintiff or
defendant, pays the winner's fees.").
95. Paulo de Oliveira v. Superior Tribunal de Justiqa, S.T.F., Pet. 2018 AgR, Relator:
Min. de Mello, 22.8.2000 (Braz.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at
714-17.
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tution or official it is that illegally encroaches upon public prop-
erty."9
9 6
The Court cautioned that this standard did not automatically
exempt the judiciary. "Judges may adopt measures that are adminis-
trative in content and that illegally undermine public wealth. Under
these circumstances, a popular action may lie insofar as the judicial
acts or omissions administratively harm state property." 97 Nonethe-
less, the justices held that the controversy at bar involved "a quintes-
sentially adjudicative act and therefore [did] not allow for the de-
ployment of a popular action.' 98 They insisted that review of an
adjudicator's judgment had to take place through other avenues.
"Substantively judicial determinations open up the following two
possibilities. If they are not final, they may be appealed in confor-
mity with the procedural legislation. If they amount to a definite de-
cision on the merits, they may be collaterally attacked or re-
scinded."99  Similarly, popular actions may serve to contest
lawmakers' administration, but not their legislation. Any challenge
of the latter must occur either in the political or electoral sphere or
through an unconstitutionality suit. 00
As an upshot, when popular actions target the state, they will
normally focus on governmental agencies. Significantly, Article
5(LXXIII) imposes a state action requirement whenever the com-
plaint seeks to tackle corruption or to protect the environment or his-
torical and cultural goods. 1  Nonetheless, the same provision admits
suits against anyone who encroaches upon public property, including
ordinary people. 10 2 Of course, the complaint in de Oliveira did not
implicate any private defendants.
All in all, popular actions offer considerable advantages over
U.S. collective suits. First and foremost, they engage the Public Min-
istry, an autonomous institution without an equivalent in the North.
Secondly, they do not demand proof of individualized harm and, ac-
cordingly, do not impose a prerequisite that significantly restricts rep-
resentative litigation in the United States.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXXIII).
102. Id.
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In addition, popular actions specifically improve on-U.S. class
suits in ways that bring them closer to qui tam and citizen suits. On
the one hand, they facilitate the implementation of societal entitle-
ments because they do not compel complainants to define a determi-
nate class. On the other hand, they enable a successful plaintiff not
only to avoid court costs but also to recover litigating expendi-
tures. 
03
Relative to class suits, popular actions present certain disad-
vantages, too, at least in Brazil, and leave room for improvement. In
the first place, petitioners need not confirm their representative com-
petence. In this respect, they resemble their counterparts in U.S. qui
tam and citizen suits. Moreover, they may not sue private parties in
all instances and thus face constraints unknown to collective litigants
in the United States. Finally, complainants in popular actions may
confront only a limited subset of broadly injurious acts. While the
scope of application is extremely wide-ranging in comparison to that
of qui tam and citizen suits, it excludes many significant claims, such
as those brought to vindicate consumer rights.
Coincidentally, some Latin American legal systems, such as
those of Colombia and Peru, neither insulate private parties from liti-
gation in any way nor restrict the range of actionable violations.'0 4
Brazilian law actually follows its Colombian and Peruvian analogues
in both respects when regulating its foremost collective suit: the pub-
lic civil action.' 0 5 This difference in regulation explains, in part, why
trans-individual litigation in Brazil has tended to gravitate towards
this procedure. The bulk of the explanation, however, lies in the fact
that the Procurator General's office, as well as associations, may ini-
tiate the proceeding. In contrast, legal entities, whether governmental
or not, may not file a popular action; only individual citizens may.'°6
Although somewhat underutilized in Brazil and not univer-
sally available in Latin America, the popular suit constitutes a key
process for the realization of the citizenry's rights. It has the poten-
103. Compare Lei No. 4.717, de 29 de Junho de 1965, art. 12, D.O.U. de 5.7.1965.
(Braz.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 713, with False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2000); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000);
Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
104. See COLOM. CONST. art. 88; PERU CONST. art. 200(5).
105. See discussion in Part V.
106. Summary 365, S.T.F., 13.12.1963 (Braz.).
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tial to make an enormous difference throughout the continent, par-
ticularly if it is improved along the lines intimated. U.S. law would,
likewise, profit handsomely from either introducing a similar proce-
dure (i.e., a generic citizen's suit) or reforming its class action to in-
corporate some of the advantageous aspects of the procedural
mechanism under consideration. Needless to say, any cross-
fertilization effort should take into earnest account the legal and cul-
tural background conditions.
V. PUBLIC CIVIL ACTIONS
Latin American state agencies and private associations-such
as public ministries and environmental organizations-have tradi-
tionally exerted themselves in the public interest largely outside the
courtroom. Lately, however, they have turned ever more often to the
judiciary in order to advance broad communal and societal ends. 107
They have frequently sought class-wide remedies by filing public
civil actions. These suits, which vary significantly in name and in
detail from one country to the next, have generally opened up a pre-
viously unimaginable path to the implementation of first-, second-
and third-generation rights.
Brazilian law, for instance, allows the Public Ministry, "a
permanent institution, essential to the state's judicial function [and
charged with defending] the legal order, the democratic system, and
all inalienable social and individual interests," 10 8 to bring public civil
actions on behalf of a sizeable group of people. These suits purport
"to address moral and pecuniary injuries to (I) the environment; (II)
consumers; (III) the urban order; (IV) goods of artistic, aesthetic, his-
torical, tourism, and landscape value; (V) other comprehensive or
collective interests; or (VI) the economic order or the popular econ-
omy."' 1 9 Certain other state entities and private associations may
also file the complaint; however, individuals may not.
1 10
Brazil's Congress enacted the relevant statute in 1985.111 It
107. See generally MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
108. BRAz. CONST. art. 127.
109. Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, art. 1, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985. (Braz.).
110. Id. art. 5.
111. Id.
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drew on existing local institutions, such as the popular action, and
foreign concepts, especially the U.S. class action. 112 The 1988 Con-
stitution endorses this procedure in defining the Procurator General
office's functions and duties.' 13
Not surprisingly, the Public Ministry has led the way in pub-
lic civil litigation. It has thus contributed enormously to the protec-
tion of group and comprehensive entitlements. Nonetheless, Brazil-
ian non-governmental organizations have played an increasingly
prominent role. Though modest relative to their first-world counter-
parts, they have grown in resources and experience over the last
twenty years and have, accordingly, enhanced their effectiveness in
promoting this kind of suit.
In U.S. class actions (as opposed to qui tam or citizen suits)
the judge has to make a finding of adequate representation prior to
certification. 1 4 The Brazilian public civil action law, like that on
popular actions, calls for no such determination.11 5 Some scholars
have persuasively argued that the court should nonetheless probe the
adequacy of the representation. 116
Of course, Article 5(1) of the statute requires the Public Min-
istry to intervene whenever it does not itself file the claim and to rep-
resent the public interest. 11 7 As noted in Part IV, such a provision
generally guarantees the presence of competent plaintiff lawyers in
the proceedings, but not necessarily a steadfast defense of the com-
mon good as perceived by the people affected. Moreover, the Procu-
rator General's office can hardly provide all of the beneficiaries a sat-
isfactory representation when they have conflicting concerns,
preferences or expectations.
Interestingly, Article 13 of the Public Civil Actions Act calls
for a fund into which defeated defendants must pay damages. It de-
mands that the Public Ministry and community delegates take part in
the administration of the monies. This arrangement reflects the aspi-
112. PEDRO LEZA, TEORIA GERAL DA AIAO CIVIL PUBLICA 161-62 (2003).
113. BRAz. CONST. art. 129(111).
114. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a)(4).
115. See Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, art. 1, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985. (Braz.).
116. Ant6nio Gidi, A Representaqdo Adequada nas Aqaes Coletivas Brasileiras. Uma
Proposta, 108 REV. DE PROCEsso 61 (2002); Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Aq6es coletivas Ibero-
Americanas: novas questaes sobre a legitimaqdo e a coisa julgada, 98 REV. FORENSE 4, 5
(2002); PEDRO LEZA, TEORIA GERAL DA AQAO CIVIL POBLICA 195-96 (2003).
117. Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, art. 5(1), D.O.U. de 25.7.1985. (Braz.).
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ration that compensation in these suits accrue not to individual plain-
tiffs as a windfall, but rather to the collectivity as a whole.
Under Article 1, the remedy may include moral damages,
which roughly cover pain and suffering, but sometimes also have a
punitive component. In public civil actions, any moral indemnifica-
tion also goes to the fund required by Article 13. In the United
States, qui tam judgments divide up treble damages between the gov-
ernment and the relator, while the rare citizen suits that provide for
monetary compensation sometimes allow the plaintiff to recover
"threefold" compensation for her injuries. 118 Of course, in U.S. class
actions, the court must ensure not only that the remedy is just in re-
gards to all class members but also that any settlement is "fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate."" 9 At any rate, after the distribution takes
place, the beneficiaries spend their part of the award as they see fit.
Resjudicata rules under Article 16 of the Public Civil Actions
Act reproduce those applicable to popular actions almost exactly.
"The judgment" in these actions, accordingly, "shall [generally] con-
stitute resjudicata, erga omnes.' 12 0 As a result, any one of the bene-
ficiaries may demand that the defendant comply with a decision that
favors all of them and may start an execution proceeding in case of
noncompliance. Article 16 differs from its homologue in the Popular
Actions Act merely to the extent that it restricts the preclusive effect
to "the jurisdictional limits of the issuing court." Accordingly, if a
trial court in Bahia rules against a company for discriminating against
Afro-Brazilians, the judgment would not bind the defendant else-
where. Plaintiffs in the state of Minas Gerais would have to file a
new complaint in order to stop the enterprise from engaging in the
same practices against them.
Furthermore, Article 21 makes the relevant provisions of Title
III of the Consumer Code applicable to all public civil actions. As a
result, one must interpret the public civil actions statute in conjunc-
118. Compare 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(2), 3730(d)(2) (2000) (The violator "is liable to
the... Government for a civil penalty... plus 3 times the amount of damages [that] the
Government sustains because of the" false claim, while "the person bringing the action...
shall receive an amount [that] shall be not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent
of the proceeds of the action .... ") with 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (Any "person ... in-
jured.., by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may ... recover threefold the
damages by him sustained.").
119. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(e)(2).
120. Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, art. 16, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985. (Braz.).
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tion with that Title. The latter, in its Article 81, promotes the vindi-
cation of the following catalogue of interests:
(I) comprehensive interests or rights, which are trans-
individual, as well as indivisible, and pertain to an in-
determinate group of people linked by common issues
of fact;
(II) collective interests or rights, which are trans-
individual, as well as indivisible, and pertain to a
group, category, or class of people linked to each
other or to the opposing party by virtue of a legal rela-
tionship;
(III) homogenous individual interests or rights, which
stem from a common origin."'
This precept, therefore, introduces a complex and abstract taxonomy
of group rights. The categories are best illustrated through a concrete
example. For instance, a case in which a prison neglects security
regulations may give rise to all three kinds of claims.
First, the surrounding neighborhood may assert a comprehen-
sive right to a safe residential environment. The group is defined in
terms of the fact that its members live close to the correctional facil-
ity. It is basically indeterminate not only because no one knows how
far the safety risk will spread, but also because people may move into
or out of the area. The right at issue transcends the individual
neighbors and cannot be apportioned among them.
Second, the inmates may seek to vindicate a shared right to
nonviolent incarceration conditions. They constitute a collectivity by
virtue of having a joint legal relationship with the defendant, which
has specific juridical obligations towards them as a group. The right
at stake transcends the individuals and is not divisible.
Third, homeowners may claim a homogenous individual right
to maintain the value of their property. They converge on a set of
similar factual and legal circumstances. Their respective rights stem
from a common source, viz., homeownership in the vicinity, but are
relatively distinguishable from each other.
Of course, these simple illustrations give rise to further uncer-
tainties about the scope of the various classifications. They also raise
121. C6digo de Protegao e Defesa do Consumidor [C.D.C.] tit. 111(l), art. 81 (Braz.).
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questions about the purpose of the categorization. In fact, the spe-
cific categories are somewhat arbitrary, almost as much as those es-
tablished by Rule 23(b) for class actions in the United States. Both
systems would operate more coherently if they generically embraced
litigation to protect comprehensive or group entitlements, established
a series of common prerequisites for all such suits and empowered
trial judges to impose additional strictures on a case-by-case basis.
In Minist~rio Ptiblico do Estado de Sdo Paulo v. Associaqdo
Notre Dame de Educaqdo e Cultura, the Brazilian Supreme Court not
only struggled considerably with these taxonomical issues, but also
generally defined the contours of this procedural institution.' 22 "The
Sdo Paulo Public Ministry... filed a public civil action [seeking] a
preliminary injunction against respondent, Notre Dame Association
for Education and Culture, a school in Sdo Vicente, Sdo Paulo," for
raising tuition beyond the "limits established by the State Education
Council."' 123 The high tribunal unanimously agreed with the plaintiff
on the merits: "Respondent undoubtedly violated the law when it au-
thorized the tuition hike."' 24 The justices further rejected "the con-
tention that the Public Ministry [lacked] standing to defend the inter-
ests of the collectivity."' 2 5  "In this concrete case," the Court
responded, "the Ministry clearly [had] standing to bring a public civil
action in order to protect collective interests in such an extremely
delicate and socially significant terrain, which the state must police
with utmost care."
' 126
In his concurrence, Justice Celso de Mello agreed "that the
Public Ministry [had] standing to file public civil actions to challenge
the increase in monthly school fees." 1 He declared further:
The Brazilian legal system appreciates the singularity
and importance of certain social values and calls on
the state to safeguard them. Accordingly, it has
tended, along with its counterparts elsewhere, to col-
lectivize procedural instruments. In particular, it has
122. Minist~rio Pitblico do Estado de Sdo Paulo v. Associago Notre Dame de Educaqdo
e Cultura, S.T.F., RE-163231, Relator: Min. Corr~a, 26.2.1997 (Braz.), translated and
reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30, at 751-60.
123. Id. (Opinion by Corr~a, J.) 1.
124. Id. (Opinion by Correa, J.) 22.
125. Id. 32.
126. Id. 31.
127. Id. (Opinion by de Mello, J.).
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created an agile means for an effective protection in
court of meta-individual interests.
1 28
From this standpoint, de Mello concluded that the Ministry "may cer-
tainly file a complaint to defend the collective interests of private
school parents and students as well as to impede an arbitrary increase
in tuition." 
129
Article 84 of Brazil's Consumer Code actually grants courts
broad injunctive power in this kind of action. They may deny plain-
tiffs an injunction only if compliance is impossible.3 U.S. law
treats this matter radically differently. Federal courts in the United
States must refuse a request for injunctive relief whenever damages
would sufficiently compensate the complainants.' 31  The Brazilian
conception reveals a civil law bias in favor of specific perform-
ance. 132 It demands considerable engagement on the part of the judi-
ciary, which must ordinarily issue an injunction in these cases as well
as guarantee compliance.
Article 103, in turn, adds a complex set of res judicata rules
that significantly alter the parameters defined in the Public Civil Ac-
tions Act. 133 Specifically, a judgment against a claim based on com-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 84, D.O.U. de 12.9.1990. (Braz.).
131. The U.S. Supreme Court "has stated that '[t]he basis of injunctive relief in the fed-
eral courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies."' Sampson
v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500, 506-07 (1959)). When damages suffice, plaintiffs have an adequate remedy in law.
132. "The civil law system... [has] by and large proceeded on the premise that specific
redress should be ordered whenever possible .... " E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1150-51 (1970). See also E. Allan Fars-
worth, Damages and Specific Relief 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 247, 249 (1979) (The "proposed
preference of Civil law systems" is "for specific relief on doctrinal grounds."). But cf
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1123 (2d ed. 1977)
(Despite "the German preference for specific relief over other remedies," the French system
evinces "difficulties with specific relief," which "may rest in some measure on French soci-
ety's reluctance.., to put severe pressure on contumacious defendants."). Article 947 of the
Brazilian Civil Code seems to make specific performance the preferred form of relief. It de-
clares that debtors may advance the monetary value of the obligation only if they are unable
to perform. C6digo Civil [C.C.] art. 947 (Braz.). In contrast, Articles 247 and 249 appear to
express a preference for damages as a remedy. They establish that the debtor must pay the
creditor either to hire someone to carry out the obligation or to provide compensation for an
unfulfilled duty. C.C. arts. 247, 249 (Braz.). Read together, these three provisions suggest
that if the duty is transferable, the debtor must reimburse the creditor for the expense of hir-
ing a substitute, but that if the duty is not transferable, the debtor must, if at all possible, per-
form or, otherwise, pay damages.
133. Compare Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, art. 16, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985.
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prehensive or collective entitlements does not "impair the individual
interests and rights" of the people represented. 134 As a result, any
such person may subsequently file a new complaint on her own be-
half. Furthermore, if the final decision refuses to recognize claimed
homogenous individual rights, "any concerned person who did not
intervene in the original proceeding may file an individual indemnifi-
cation action." 
35
The judgments in these actions, consequently, have extremely
asymmetrical res judicata effects. When the plaintiff seeks to en-
force comprehensive or collective entitlements, the purported benefi-
ciaries profit from a victory, but do not have to endure the conse-
quences of a defeat. Since complaints for the enforcement of
homogenous individual rights typically seek damages, the people
concerned usually also benefit from a favorable determination, but
are not bound by an unfavorable outcome. Hence, all of these indi-
viduals have an incentive not to seek intervention in the original ac-
tion, so as to take a second bite at the apple in case of defeat.
In general, this asymmetry operates unfairly vis-t6-vis the de-
fendant and leads to inefficiency, viz., to repetitive litigation. In light
of the absence of an adequacy of representation requirement, how-
ever, the individuals affected could legitimately object to a symmet-
rical approach. In other words, they could justifiably remonstrate
against the extinction of their entitlements upon a process that did not
properly consider their interests. Therefore, a move towards symme-
try in the preclusion regime should go hand in hand with a shift to-
wards demanding that complainants demonstrate their ability to rep-
resent everyone fairly.
Peru and Uruguay have already incorporated this kind of
"comprehensive interest" action into their legal order;' 36 other Iberian
American nations are presently considering following suit.137 In both
(Braz.) with Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 103, D.O.U. de 12.9.1990.
(Braz.).
134. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 103(1), D.O.U. de 12.9.1990.
(Braz.).
135. Id. art. 103(2).
136. See Resoluci6n Ministerial No. 10-93-JUS, art. 82, 8 Jan. 1993, Texto Unico
Ordenado del C6digo Prosecal Civil (Peru); Ley No. 15.982, art. 42, 18 Oct. 1988, C6digo
General del Proceso (Uru.).
137. The proposed Constitution in Bolivia, for instance, creates a popular action through
which individuals, groups, the Public Ministry, and the People's Defender may defend rights
and interests "related to public patrimony, space, security, or health or to environment, as
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the Peruvian and the Uruguayan legislative schemes, however, the fi-
nal collective decision does bar posterior individual complaints. 38 In
any case, Peru's statute does adhere to the Brazilian model to the ex-
tent that it invites petitions by the "Public Ministry, as well as [by]
nonprofit associations or institutions that have standing by statute or
by virtue of a duly grounded determination by the judge."' 39 Uru-
guay's law, in turn, additionally entitles "any interested individual"
to sue. 140  As noted in Part III, the Argentine Constitution also au-
thorizes "individuals affected" to file these suits.
141
The state and existing organizations may, of course, fail to
litigate in a fully representative manner. In view of this reality, indi-
vidual participation in the judicial realization of comprehensive rights
is fundamental. In response, Brazil, as well as Peru, could either
permit individuals to bring public civil actions or allow popular suits
to advance all kinds of comprehensive entitlements and encourage
any affected person to seek a collective writ of security.
The public civil action will undoubtedly continue to diverge
from the Brazilian paradigm as it expands to other countries in the
region. Nonetheless, it has the potential to follow in the twenty-first
century the course that the writ of protection underwent in the twen-
tieth century and, accordingly, become a universally available proce-
dure throughout Iberian America. It might then have as colossal an
impact all over the region, as it has had in Brazil. Only time will tell.
VI. RESTRUCTURING U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION
As suggested in the introduction, the U.S. legal world could
well as other similar entitlements .... " Nueva Constituci6n Politica del Estado de Bolivia
[Proposed Constitution] arts. 136 & 137 (2007) (Bolivia). The charter thus essentially estab-
lishes a public civil action that does not preclude individual initiation. In Ecuador, the text
submitted by the Constitutional Assembly similarly provides for a collective writ of protec-
tion for "communitarian interests," as well as for "solidarity-based, collective, or compre-
hensive rights." Proyecto de Constituci6n de la Repdiblica del Ecuador [Proposed Constitu-
tion] art. 113(4) (2007) (Ecuador).
138. See Resoluci6n Ministerial No. 10-93-JUS, art. 82, 8 Jan. 1993, Texto Unico Orde-
nado del C6digo Prosecal Civil (Peru); Ley No. 15.982, art. 220, 18 Oct. 1988, C6digo Ge-
neral del Proceso (Uru.).
139. Resoluci6n Ministerial No. 10-93-JUS, art. 82, 8 Jan. 1993, Texto Unico Ordenado
del C6digo Prosecal Civil (Peru).
140. Ley No. 15.982, art. 42, 18 Oct. 1988, C6digo General del Proceso (Uru.).
141. ARG. CONST. art 43.
[47:248
UPPING THE ANTE
find inspiration in Latin America to improve its own approach to col-
lective litigation. In the first place, it could create a popular suit for
the protection of comprehensive entitlements. United States law-
makers could, secondly, institute an independent state body, along
the lines of the Public Ministry, with power to file both communal
and societal complaints. The Judicial Conference's civil advisory
committee could, thirdly, modify Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to grant standing to organizations, as well as indi-
viduals, to file class actions. It could, finally, embrace a single,
straightforward 23(b) classification.
The U.S. government could take a page from its Latin Ameri-
can counterparts and entitle private parties to vindicate any kind of
comprehensive right. It could achieve this end either by amendment
of the procedural rules or by statutory enactment. At present, liti-
gants may sue on behalf of society as whole only if they qualify to
initiate a qui tam or citizen suit under one of the few statutes avail-
able for that purpose. Of course, they may also attempt to masquer-
ade as a subgroup and file a class action. Nonetheless, such a strat-
egy normally forces them to scale back or abandon their macro-
collective aim, inasmuch as they must restrict themselves to defend-
ing micro-collective interests.
The proposed mechanism could, conceivably, incorporate the
standing requirements set forth by the federal Supreme Court for citi-
zen suits. 142 Alternatively, and preferably, it could operate as a qui
tam action and embrace the premise that the state assigns its claim to
the plaintiff.143 In this context, the justices have embraced "the doc-
trine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in
fact suffered by the assignor" and have concluded "that the United
142. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The Court
stated:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized; and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural'
or 'hypothetical."' Second, there must be a causal connection between the in-
jury and the conduct complained of .... Third, it must be "likely" as opposed
to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable deci-
sion."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
143. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2000) ("A person may bring a civil action for a
violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action
shall be brought in the name of the Government.").
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States' injury in fact suffices to confer standing."'' 44
The procedure in question would not, in itself, threaten the
legislature's prerogative to protect the common weal. It could incor-
porate the prerequisite that tribunals generally exercise substantial
prudence and that they specifically dismiss any societal litigation that
might undermine legitimate legislative action. Judicial enforcement
would then take place only under exceptional circumstances. While
litigants would not have to wait for a law authorizing them to pro-
ceed, they would face a rather strict standard in court.
The United States could, additionally, learn from its southern
neighbors about the benefits of disposing of an autonomous public
entity for the implementation of meta-individual rights. It could
come to appreciate how such an institution might avoid the political
pressure that the Attorney General and administrative agencies con-
front when attempting to address controversial claims. The Congress
could, consequently, establish an equivalent to the Procurator Gen-
eral's Office, carefully minding local idiosyncrasies. It could reduce
redundancy and inefficiency by demanding that that the body's staff
attorneys collaborate closely with the Justice Department, as well as
with relevant administrative agencies.
Furthermore, U.S. rule-making authorities could allow a non-
governmental association to pursue class remedies directly. Under
the current regime, it must recruit part of its membership to serve as
representatives. It thus may not itself play the role of the real party in
interest, must find substitutes and amend its pleadings if the original
plaintiffs drop out, and risks a shift in focus from the collective to the
individual. The recognition of associational standing would remove
these difficulties.
U.S. lawyers and scholars could draw lessons not only from
the successes, but also from the failings of the representative litiga-
tion model south of the border. They could, for example, transition
from noticing the previously described unwieldiness of the three
categories of the Brazilian public civil action to realizing the arbitrary
nature of the categorization of class suits in the United States.
Thereupon, they could conceive significant improvements.
The three subsections of Rule 23(b) of the U.S. Federal Rules
144. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
773-74 (2000).
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of Civil Procedure define a triad of class action types: viz., cohesion,
injunction and commonality suits. 145 They jointly set forth a precon-
dition for a class certification, inasmuch as a plaintiff seeking com-
munal relief must fit her claim within one of them. In addition, they
entail different entitlements and duties. For instance, representatives
in cohesion or injunctive suits under Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2), in
contrast to their counterparts in commonality actions under 23(b)(3),
need not send individual notification to class members.1
46
All in all, the drafters formulated the third subdivision as a re-
sidual category-almost a consolation prize-for claimants unable to
exercise either of the two other options. However, they never fully
justified this arrangement. While the committee based stricter notice
requirements on the strength of "the interests of the individuals in
pursuing their own litigations," 23(b)(3) suits do not differ signifi-
cantly from the other two types of class action in this respect. 147 Fur-
thermore, the three classifications have unclear bounds and point to
similarly controversial subcategories. In fact, they have given rise to
considerable confusion and limitless litigation. 1
48
The regulation of class suits in the United States, like that of
public civil actions in Brazil, would profit handsomely from eliminat-
ing the cumbersome existing categorization. A single group-suit
category would do. The trial judge could then make determinations
on a case-by-case basis with respect to the appropriateness of litigat-
ing collectively, the manageability of the action, the notification and
opt-out rights of class members and so forth.
As previously noted, the U.S. legal order has recently tended
to restrict rather than expand representative suits, mostly in order to
contain excessive and frivolous litigation. 49 In any case, the recom-
mended innovations, which would help advance the crucial ends of
meta-individual suits, might not lead to an increase in the total num-
ber of proceedings. Moreover, enhanced judicial supervisory and
punitive powers could help keep abuse in check.
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
146. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (requiring 23(b)(3) class
action representatives to notify all members individually and to pay the entire cost of notifi-
cation).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee's note on 1966 amendments.
148. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591 (1997).
149. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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Needless to say, extreme hostility to public law adjudication
might impede a reasonable discussion of these issues. Under such
circumstances, advocates of change would have no choice but to
formulate their arguments as persuasively as possible and to show
immense patience. They would have to alter attitudes throughout the
nation not just about collective entitlements, but about law, lato
sensu.
Obviously, these proposals call for further analysis. How ex-
actly would they work in practice? To what extent do they genuinely
respect the United States' legal peculiarity and difference vis-d-vis
Iberian America? Could they realistically command sufficient sup-
port for their eventual adoption? This section has merely set the de-
bate in motion.
VII. WRAP-UP
Latin America has started a true revolution in the area of col-
lective rights: moving beyond the paradigm of group entitlements to
that of comprehensive entitlements. It took a first, almost rhetorical
step by granting constitutional stature to a new set of substantive
rights. It has since consolidated this shift by creating procedural
mechanisms to breathe life into these guaranties.
This article has considered how Iberian American nations-
most conspicuously Brazil-have taken the idea of trans-individual
rights and processes, largely from the United States, and radically
transformed it. Various jurisdictions in the region have found inspi-
ration in the U.S. class action to create locally flavored suits for the
implementation of group entitlements. They have, additionally, insti-
tuted special procedures for the vindication of comprehensive guar-
antees.
Latin American legal systems have frequently authorized pri-
vate entities and individuals to defend, as litigants, micro-collective,
as well as macro-collective, rights. They have also granted this
power to autonomous state bodies, such as the Procurator General's
Office, which have performed aggressively on this front. This article
has proposed continuing and expanding these efforts.
Following the introduction, Part II explored the notion of rep-
resentative litigation and contrasted U.S., European and Iberian
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American perspectives on the matter. Part III examined the collec-
tive writ of protection as a device for the realization of communal
rights and recommended that, beyond organizations, individuals have
the right to sue. Part IV analyzed the popular action as a mechanism
through which individuals may implement certain societal rights. It
suggested expanding the scope of the suit to incorporate all such enti-
tlements and allowing associations to initiate litigation. Further, Part
V considered the use of public civil actions by the Procurator General
to enforce group and comprehensive entitlements. It suggested sim-
plifying the suit by defining the protected guaranties more flexibly
and by widening the preclusion consequences. Parts III, IV and V all
espoused imposing an adequacy-of-representation requirement. Fi-
nally, Part VI advocated modifying the U.S. legal system, by care-
fully drawing on these three procedural actions.
Micro- and macro-collective litigation underscores the inter-
connection between legal substance and procedure. Even a classi-
cally negative and first-generation right, such as free speech, pro-
foundly transforms itself when its enforcement may take place
collectively. It offers new procedural possibilities and, most signifi-
cantly, it moves beyond protecting personal expressions of ideas to
facilitating group and even societal self-determination. A meta-
individual suit in this area often entails much more than an aggrega-
tion of numerous ordinary actions. It frequently enables people not
merely to speak their minds, but additionally to coalesce into a com-
munity or a movement. For instance, the right of state employees to
use their native tongue in informal settings transmutes intensely
when asserted by a collectivity-such as the Aymaras in Bolivia or
Latino/as in the United States-instead of an isolated individual.
The interface between substantive and procedural law in this realm,
as well as in others, certainly deserves additional attention and study.
Collective suits, like protection and unconstitutionality ac-
tions, have had a peculiar history and have played a key role in the
defense of fundamental guaranties in Latin America. Nonetheless,
they surfaced more recently than these two other procedural devices,
are still basically under construction, and, therefore, have yet to take
a mature, or relatively stable, form. Over the next several years, one
will have a clearer sense of how this kind of litigation will finally
shape up and affect the rights ethos across the continent.
These representative actions have found broad appeal in Ibe-
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rian America partly as a way to make up for people's longstanding
lack of access to justice and to address large-scale violations of
rights. They generally enable tribunals to process mass injuries effi-
ciently and to face up directly to vital public values. Latin America
should continue to upgrade these causes of action, minding both ex-
periences abroad and local conditions. The rest of the world should,
in turn, take notice of the remarkable regional achievements on this
front.
U.S. law has much to learn from the investigated accom-
plishments. It could, first, empower any concerned individual or or-
ganization to enforce societal entitlements and, second, establish an
independent entity, similar to the public ministry, with the authority
to set collective suits in motion. The framers of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure could, third, concede standing to associations, as
well as individuals, to file class actions. They could, finally, re-draft
and improve Rule 23 by formulating a single, clear-cut category un-
der section 23(b).
This piece has painted a predominantly positive picture and
insisted upon its reality, salience and underestimation. It has taken a
page from Paul Gauguin by maintaining paradise in sight and refus-
ing to dwell on the occasionally hellish conditions encountered on
site.) 5  Unlike Gauguin, however, this work has recognized imper-
fections and impediments from the outset and has approached its sub-
ject overall not externally, as sublime exotica, but rather internally,
from the perspective of the players involved. From such an outlook,
it has consistently pointed to existing institutional flaws and possible
improvements and will now briefly reflect upon more structural and
rather entrenched challenges. It will thus invite further future reflec-
tion.
The successes under examination have periodically taken
place even against an adverse backdrop of a weak adherence to the
rule of law. In fact, the extent to which people and institutions in
Latin America honor this notion varies enormously among and
within the various countries in the region and has noticeably in-
creased in the last two decades.1 51 Nonetheless, the problem persists
150. See generally PAUL GAUGUIN, AVANT ET APRES, AVEC LES VINGT-SEPT DESSINS DU
MANUSCRIT ORIGINAL (1923).
151. Rogelio Perez Perdomo similarly qualifies the extent of the mismatch between le-
gal practices and principles. Rogelio Perez Perdomo, Notas para una historia social del de-
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and intermittently threatens, inter alia, the collective realization of
rights.
The previously mentioned victories could prove to be short
lived within such an environment. Beyond adopting new measures
or punishing violators more severely, Latin American countries must
succeed in the unlikely task of changing the underlying culture. They
must effectively enhance the legitimacy of legal norms across the
board by renewing their commitment to democracy, as well as to
other ideals, such as the rule of law itself, personal freedom and
(above all) solidarity.
Of course, even if Latin America takes these enormous and
improbable steps towards the institutionalization of the principle of
legality and ensures the fulfillment of group and comprehensive enti-
tlements, it will not automatically attain social justice. The imple-
mentation of rights plays a central, but only limited-and occasion-
ally counterproductive-part in the fight against societal injustice.
This battle demands a broader and deeper engagement, within and
without the state, against inequity and marginalization. Legal actors
throughout the region will need to take other steps-in addition to
(and sometimes in substitution of) the pursuit of trans-individual enti-
tlements-in order to attain emancipation for all.
recho en America Latina: La relaci6n de las precticas y los principios juridicos, 52 REV.
COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS P.R. 1 (1991), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 30,
at 66-77.
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